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Since Rijndael was accepted as the new Advanced Encryption Standard 
by the NIST, several techniques have been developed to attack it.  One of the 
more controversial techniques is a relatively new mathematically based attack 
known as Extended Sparse Linearization, or XSL.  Estimates for a successful 
attack on AES using XSL are extremely large (best estimate is 2100 encryptions), 
so no attempt to implement the attack has yet been made.   
To show that the attack is viable, a reduced version of AES can be 
implemented and a modification of the XSL attack can be used on the reduced 
version.  I have implemented the reduced version of AES, referred to as rAES, as 
well as the attack.  In this document it will be shown that the attack fails.  Since 
the attack failed on the reduced version, the result can be extended to show that 
it cannot be made on the full version either. 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF A SPARSE LINEARIZATION ATTACK 
ON THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD 
 
 
 
by 
Stephanie D. Rednour 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School at 
The University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greensboro 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 Approved by 
 
 
____________________________ 
 Committee Chair 
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents Tom and Bonnie Rednour 
And 
To Tavis Curry 
 iii
APPROVAL PAGE 
 This Thesis has been approved by the following committee of the Faculty 
of the Graduate School at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro. 
 
 
 
 
Committee Chair ___________________________________ 
 
Committee Members ___________________________________ 
___________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
Date of Acceptance by Committee 
 
___________________________ 
Date of Final Oral Examination 
 iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
Thanks to my advisor Shanmugathasan Suthaharan and to my committee 
members Lixin Fu and Fereidoon Sadri. 
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ..............................................................................................vii 
CHAPTER 
 I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
   The Advanced Encryption Standard..................................................... 2 
   The Linearization Techniques ............................................................ 10 
 II. REDUCED AES....................................................................................... 13 
 III. APPLIED ATTACK .................................................................................. 20 
   The Equations .................................................................................... 20 
   The Attack .......................................................................................... 23 
 IV. RESULTS ................................................................................................ 29 
 V. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................... 30 
   General Conclusions .......................................................................... 31 
   Future Work........................................................................................ 32 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................. 33 
APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES ................................... 35 
APPENDIX B. INPUT DATA ........................................................................... 41 
APPENDIX C OUTPUT DATA ....................................................................... 69 
 vi
LIST OF TABLES 
 
   Page 
TABLE 
 1. The Round Constants ................................................................................ 7 
 2. Multiplication in GF(24)............................................................................. 15 
 3. The rAES Round Constants..................................................................... 18 
 4. Matrix Terms - First Half .......................................................................... 39 
 5. Matrix Terms - Second Half ..................................................................... 40 
 
 vii
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
   Page 
FIGURES 
 1. The AES SBox........................................................................................... 3 
 2. State matrix before and after ShiftRows .................................................... 4 
 3. MixColumns Matrix .................................................................................... 5 
 4. State matrix before and after InverseShiftRows......................................... 8 
 5. Inverse SBox ............................................................................................. 9 
 6. InverseMixColumns Matrix......................................................................... 9 
 7. Matrix Representation of SBox Derivation ............................................... 17 
 8. 4-Bit SBox................................................................................................ 17 
 9. 4-Bit Inverse SBox ................................................................................... 17 
 10. Modified Gaussian Elimination Version 1................................................. 24 
 11. Modified Gaussian Elimination Version 2................................................. 27 
 12. All SBox Terms and Mappings................................................................. 35 
 13. SBox Equations - Set One....................................................................... 36 
 14. Equations after the SBox ......................................................................... 36 
 15. SBox Equations – Set Two ...................................................................... 37 
 16. ExpandRoundKey Equations ................................................................... 38 
 
 1
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 After investigating several cryptographic algorithms for possible research 
topics, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) was chosen.  The AES was 
selected because it is relatively new and untested, providing the best opportunity 
in finding a research topic.  Once the AES was chosen, the algorithm was 
examined in detail.  The AES was implemented using Java so that the actual 
running of the algorithm for the encryption and decryption could be observed. 
 Then others’ work into attacking the AES was examined.  Several attack 
techniques have been proposed for the AES including Extended Linearization [4], 
Extended Sparse Linearization [4], power attacks [2], and a modification of the 
AES to improve the running time for Extended Sparse Linearization called the 
Better Encryption Standard (BES) [9].  While investigating the details of these 
approaches, several authors called for research into applying the XSL technique 
on a real system [3, 8, 11, 12], to see if it worked in an applied fashion and not 
just as theory.  Therefore it was decided to pursue an attack that would be similar 
to XSL on an encryption algorithm like the AES to see if the attack works. 
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The Advanced Encryption Standard 
In the late 1990’s it became apparent to the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) that the encryption standard, DES, was no longer 
sufficiently secure.  Therefore they issued a request for an algorithm to replace 
DES.  Once agreed upon the new standard would be referred to as the 
Advanced Encryption Standard.  Several algorithms were submitted to become 
AES, and through a tiered process of elimination ultimately one was chosen.  
This was the submission from Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen and they called 
their algorithm Rijndael, a combination of both of their last names. 
 Some modifications were made that restricted the original Rijndael so the 
AES is not exactly the same as the original submission.  For the purposes of this 
paper we are concerned with the final version in the AES, released by the NIST 
in November of 2001 [14].  The AES algorithm is a block cipher, which means 
that the original plaintext message is broken down into blocks of a fixed size, and 
then the algorithm processes the blocks individually.  In the AES the block size is 
128 bits.  Each block is handled exactly the same way, so we need only concern 
ourselves with how one block is processed.  The AES encryption performs 
several operations on the block, which are described as four steps.  These steps 
are called SubBytes (Substitute Bytes), ShiftRows, MixColumns, and 
AddRoundKey.  The steps are performed repeatedly on the block.  Each 
repetition is referred to as a round.  There is one deviance in the pattern of steps.  
In the last round the MixColumns step is not performed.  Similarly, the AES 
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decryption performs four steps, three of them are different, called 
InverseSubBytes, InverseShiftRows, InverseMixColumns, and the last step is the 
same as the encryption’s AddRoundKey. 
 The first step of the encryption, SubBytes, breaks the 128-bit block into 
bytes and performs a substitution on each byte.  This substitution is made using 
a look-up table called the SBox.  For any byte, the first four bits represent the row 
in the table and the last four bits represent the column.  The intersection of the 
row and column gives you the output byte.  For example, the input byte 
00101010 would be split into row 0010 and column 1010.  For clarity the figure of 
the SBox below uses hexadecimal entries so we have row 2 and column A.  As 
you can see in Figure 1, 2A maps to E5 so the output byte is 11100101. 
Figure 1: The AES SBox 
 4
 The second step, ShiftRows, takes the bytes in the block and mixes them 
within their own row.  For this step, and the MixColumns step, it is simpler to 
understand the process if you consider the 128 bits of the block as a matrix, with 
four bytes per row and four bytes per column.  As you can see in Figure 2, 
ShiftRows leaves the first row of the matrix alone, but the rest of the rows are 
shuffled.  Each entry in the figure represents one byte, so that the top row is 
composed of bits 0-31 of the block, row two is bits 32-63, row three is bits 64-95, 
and row four is bits 96-127. 
 The third step, MixColumns, performs mathematical operations on the 
columns of the result of the ShiftRows step.  This is essentially a matrix 
multiplication.  The input state matrix to MixColumns is multiplied by a given 
matrix and the result is the output of MixColumns.  You can see the matrix used 
for the multiplication in Figure 3.  For instance, the first entry in the output matrix 
would be calculated as follows: 
 
Figure 2: State matrix before and after 
ShiftRows. 
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where s0 is the first byte from the ShiftRows output, s4 is the fifth byte, and so on.  
The addition is done using a bit wise exclusive-or ( ).  The matrix multiplication is 
done in the Galois Field GF(28). 
 A field is a set with two binary operations, usually referred to as addition 
and multiplication, which operate on that set.  The two operations must not have 
results that are outside of the set and there must be a multiplicative inverse for 
each element in the set [13].  A Galois Field is a finite field, which means that the 
set of elements of the field is finite.  The set for GF(28) contains the integers from 
zero to 255. 
One does not need to understand all the properties of a Galois Field in 
order to perform the multiplication, there a just two rules to use.  First, one finds 
the results of multiplying the number by the powers of two.  If the result is greater 
than 255, then an additional operation must be performed.  This operation is to 
add the result to a given constant, and throw away the bits over eight. 
 
 
Figure 3: MixColumns Matrix (in hexadecimal) 
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For example, 
, but 
 
so we take that result and add it to the constant 100011011 as defined in the 
AES.  Then one has . 
 To perform multiplications with numbers that aren’t powers of two, one just 
use a bit-wise exclusive-or with the powers of two that make up that number.  For 
example, 
 
 
which is what one would expect. 
 The last step is the AddRoundKey, which takes the result of the 
MixColumns step and performs an exclusive-or with a secret key.  The secret key 
is where all the security of the AES lies.  Without the secret key anyone could 
perform the above operations and get the same results.  The secret key needs to 
be chosen then so that no one can guess it.  The use of one secret key in this 
way makes the AES a private key system.  This means that the key must be kept 
private.  In the AES, the secret key is initially either 128, 192, or 256 bits long.  
An operation called ExpandRoundKey is performed on the key to generate 
several round keys.  One round key is used in each of the AddRoundKey steps 
since the 4 steps are performed repeatedly.  The number of times the four steps 
are repeated is based on the size of the initial key.  Each repetition is referred to 
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as a round.  For a 128-bit key there are 10 rounds, for a 192-bit key there are 12 
rounds, and for a 256-bit key there are 14 rounds.  There original key is added to 
the plaintext before the first round, so there are actually 11, 13, and 15 keys 
used, respectively.  Keep in mind, all the round keys are derived mathematically 
from the original key, so if you have either the round keys or the original key you 
can calculate the others. 
 The ExpandRoundKey operation is performed only once.  The operation 
works on a row of the original key at a time.  A row is also referred to as a word, 
which is 32-bits long in the 128-bit key case.  Therefore the original key can be 
expressed as four words, which we will call w0, w1, w2, and w3.  We will index the 
round keys starting from w4 for the first word of the first round key (so then the 
second round key starts at w8.)  The first three words in each round key are 
calculated the same way as follows: 
wi = wi - 4  wi - 1 
where i ranges from 0 to 44 for a 128-bit key.  The last word in each round key 
uses a more complex calculation: 
wi = wi - 4  SubWord(RotWord(wi - 1))  Rconi / 4 
Table 1: The Round Constants for the 10-round version of AES (in hexadecimal)
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RotWord simply performs a one byte circular left shift on the word.  SubWord 
uses the SBox to substitute each of the bytes for a new byte in the same way as 
described above.  The Rconi / 4 is a constant.  The constants for the 128-bit key 
are given in Table 1. 
 All of the above refers to the encryption of data using the AES, but that is 
not very useful if you cannot perform a decryption that gives you back the original 
data.  The decryption is very similar to the encryption, but it is not exactly the 
same.  Essentially, all of the steps in the encryption must be performed 
backwards to get the plaintext again.  The input to the decryption is the 
ciphertext.  The last round key is added back to it since the inverse of exclusive-
or is just another exclusive-or.  Since we are undoing the last round, we do not 
need to perform the InverseMixColumns step yet, so we perform the 
InverseShiftRows step.  This step just performs the shifts in the opposite 
direction as can be seen in Figure 4.  
 The next step to perform is InverseSubBytes.  This step works the same 
way as SubBytes but it uses the Inverse SBox to do the substitution.  The 
Figure 4: State matrix before and after InverseShiftRows. 
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Inverse SBox can be seen in Figure 5.  If we take the example from before you 
can see how the Inverse SBox reverses the SBox effect on the bits.  So the input 
byte 11100101 would be split into row 1110 and column 0101.  In hexadecimal 
this is row E column 5.  As you can see in Figure 5, E5 maps to 2A, which is 
what we had input to the SBox before.  
 The third operation is to add the second to last round key to the output of 
the Inverse SBox.  Now we are in the second to last round, so we need to 
perform the InverseMixColumns.  InverseMixColumns works the same way as 
Figure 5: Inverse SBox 
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MixColumns, but a different matrix is used for the multiplication.  This matrix, 
shown in Figure 6, is the inverse of the MixColumns matrix. 
 From the second round of the decryption on all of the steps are performed, 
with an additional AddRoundKey done at the very end which will produce the 
plaintext message. 
The Linearization Techniques 
Once Rijndael was submitted to NIST, others began examining it for 
weaknesses.  It was noted in [10] that Rijndael had an unusual structure that 
allows it to be expressed as equations because it can be broken into distinct 
parts.  This observation led to a technique to attempt to break the encryption 
using these equations.  One of the techniques proposed for an attack on Rijndael 
was Extended Linearization, or XL [4].  This technique was devised for other 
encryption algorithms and was applied to the AES in [4].   
XL converts the operations performed on the block into linear equations.  
The derivation of the equations (which is the same for XL and XSL) is detailed in 
Chapter III.  The hope is that this large system of equations can be solved, which 
Figure 6: InverseMixColumns Matrix (in hexadecimal) 
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results in obtaining the key.  The system of equations is represented as a matrix 
since it is linear.  A technique for diagonalizing the matrix, such as Gaussian 
Elimination, is applied to see if the system is solvable.  If the system is solved 
then the key has been found and the encryption is cracked.  If the system is not 
solved, an attempt to change the system so that it is solvable is made.  This is 
done by solving the system for one term, then multiplying all of the equations by 
all the possible second order terms.  If any new equations result, they are added 
to the system.  Then the Gaussian Elimination is tried on the updated system.  In 
this fashion the process repeats until the system is solved. 
When analyzing the XL technique, the authors estimated that it would be 
better than brute force, but still outside the realm of feasibility.  A second 
technique was designed by Courtois and Pieprzyk [4] to improve upon XL, which 
was termed XSL or Extended Sparse Linearization.  This technique also attempts 
to solve a large system of linear equations to obtain the key, but it improves upon 
the method of increasing the number of equations to speed up the process.  In 
both techniques the system of linear equations is considered sparse.  This 
means that for any given equation in the system only a relatively small number of 
terms are present.  Such a system is shown in Appendix A and you can see it is 
composed largely of zeroes, meaning those terms have a zero coefficient. 
In XSL, once a certain number of linearly independent equations are 
determined for the system, the two alternating steps are used to solve the 
system.  First, the same as XL, an algorithm to attempt to solve the matrix 
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representing the equations is used, such as Gaussian Elimination.  If the system 
is unsolvable, because there aren’t enough equations compared to the number of 
terms, the T′ Method is used to increase the number of equations to enough to 
solve all of the terms in the system.  The T′ Method is where XSL differs from XL.  
In this method the equations are all solved relative to two terms.  This gives two 
equivalent systems.  Next, the terms from the second system, instead of all 
possible terms, are used to increase the number of equations by multiplying the 
terms in the second system by the equations in the second system (see [16] for 
an example of this method).  By repeating the Gaussian Elimination and T′ 
Method steps the hope is that eventually a solvable system will be created.  For 
the AES the estimate given by Murphy and Robshaw for creating a solvable 
system is 2100 [9]. 
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CHAPTER II 
REDUCED AES 
 
 
 
 As was stated in the previous chapter, the estimate for the number of 
executions needed to find the key for the 10-round AES is 2100.  This is 
significantly less than a brute force attack, but it would still require too long to be 
feasible.  To show whether or not there is an attack against the AES that works 
when applied, the running time of the attack needed to be reduced. 
 To decrease the running time to something that was feasible there are two 
choices, to modify the attack or to modify the algorithm the attack is on.  For XSL 
the running time is tied to the size of the system of equations and the number of 
terms in those equations.  Therefore if the number of equations and terms can be 
reduce then XSL should run more quickly.  In order to reduce the number of 
equations and therefore the running time of XSL, I created a reduced version of 
AES, that we will call rAES.  This version has all the same operations as the full 
version, but it manipulates four bits in place of bytes.  Therefore all of the bit 
measurements are halved.  The block size is 64 bits and the smallest key is 64 
bits.  The program was implemented to allow the number of rounds to be 
changed as well.  For the 64 bit key anywhere from one to ten rounds can be 
executed.  The hope was that the combination of reducing the block size and the 
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number of rounds would allow the equations to be solved in a feasible amount of 
time. 
 In order to convert AES to four bits, several parts of the algorithm had to 
be modified.  Of course all of the manipulations had to be altered to take four bits 
instead of a byte, but more complex changes had to be made to the SBox, the 
Galois Field had to be changed, and the round constants had to be recalculated.  
The authors of Rijndael were thorough and included their rationale for the choice 
of SBox and round constants, so the 4-bit version was created to also meet those 
criteria [13, 14].  Both the encryption and decryption steps for rAES were created.  
The reduced algorithm was kept as close to the full version at every opportunity 
in order to ensure it’s behavior would be as close to equivalent as possible. 
 For the AES [14], the SBox was derived following three steps.  The first 
step is to fill the SBox with the values from 00000000 through 11111111 going 
across the columns and then down the rows, so the first row in hexadecimal is 
00, 01, 02, 03, …, 0F and the second row is 10, 11, 12, 13, ..., 1F.  Next, all of 
the entries are changed to their multiplicative inverse over the Galois Field.  
Finally an equation is used to manipulate the bits of each byte.  The equation 
exclusive-ors specific bits in each byte and adds them to a constant as follows: 
yi = xi  x(i+4) mod 8  x(i+5) mod 8  x(i+6) mod 8  x(i+7) mod 8  ci 
where xi represents the input bits, numbered so that the byte 10010000 would 
have x7 = 1 and x4 = 1 with the other xi equal to zero.  The value yi is the output bit 
that is used as part of the SBox entry for that byte and ci is a constant, given as 
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the hexadecimal number 63.  The rationale given for this choice was so that the 
correlation between the input byte and the output byte could not be easily 
expressed as a mathematical function [13, 14].  The specific choice of which bits 
to use and what constant to use were chosen to prevent the SBox from having 
any mappings where SubBytes(x) = x and no mappings where SubBytes(x) =  
(means the 1’s in x become 0’s in  and the 0’s in x become 1’s in .)  Finally, the 
SBox was designed so that the inverse SBox, used for decryption, would not 
have a case where ISBox(x) = SBox(x). 
Table 2: Multiplication in GF(24) 
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 Several different rAES SBoxes were tried, and through trial and error one 
was found that meet all of the above criteria.  It was found by creating an SBox 
with a 2-bit index to the row and column and each entry is four bits.  This created 
an SBox with 16 entries instead of 256.  The entries were initialized to 0000 
through 1111 with the first row being 0000, 0001, 0010, 0011 in binary and the 
second row being 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111.  All of the multiplicative inverses were 
found using the Galois Field GF(24) instead of GF(28).  For this Galois Field the 
constant 10011 was chosen to be used if the value exceeded four bits.  For 
example, .  All of the multiplications in GF(24) 
can be seen in Table 2. 
 The GF(24) containing the set from zero to 16 with the addition and 
multiplication operations as defined above does create a Galois Field.  Since the 
addition is done as an exclusive-or the addition is automatically in the field.  By 
examining Table 2 it is easy to see that all of the values are in the set.  Also, all 
of the values in the set have a multiplicative inverse (the entries in the table that 
are equal to one).  Therefore this is a Galois Field. 
 Finally the following equation was applied to get the resulting SBox: 
yi = xi  x(i+1) mod 4  x(i+3) mod 4  ci 
where in this case ci is five.  This equation and constant value were found to be a 
combination that allowed an SBox that met all the necessary criteria.  For 
instance, the entry at (0, 2) was calculated as follows: 
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The value was initialized to 0010.  The inverse of 0010 (as can be 
found in Table 2) is 1001.  This value is then input to the equation 
so we have:  
y0 = 1  0  1  1 = 1 
y1 = 0  0  1  0 = 1 
y2 = 0  1  0  1 = 0 
y3 = 1  1  0  0 = 0 
which gives us the result of 0011 = 3. 
This example can also be done by representing the equation given above as a 
matrix, and representing the value as a column as seen in Figure 7.  The 
resulting SBox and Inverse SBox can be seen in Figures 8 and 9. 
Figure 8: 4-Bit SBox   Figure 9: 4-Bit Inverse SBox 
Figure 7:  Matrix Representation of SBox Derivation 
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 The round constants for rAES were calculated using the same method as 
those for the AES, but reduced to output four bits.  In the AES the round constant 
Rconj = (RCj, 0, 0, 0) where1 ≤ j ≤ 10 with each member of the list representing a 
byte.  The value RCj = 2 · RCj – 1 and RC1 = 1.  All of the math is performed over the 
Galois Field GF(28).  For rAES the round constant Rconj = (RCj, 0, 0, 0) where 
each member represents four bits.  The value RCj = 2 · RCj – 1 and RC1 = 1.  All of 
the math is performed over the Galois Field GF(24).  For example, the calculation 
for RC2 = 2 · 1 = 2 so Rcon2 = 0010000000000000.  The round constants for rAES 
can be seen in Table 3. 
 The ShiftRows and InverseShiftRows for rAES work exactly the same as 
in the AES except each entry in the matrix shown in Figures 2 and 4 represent 
four bits instead of a byte (b0 represents bits 0-3, the top row represents bits 0-
15, row two is bits 16-31, row three is bits 32-47, and row four is bits 48-63). 
 The MixColums step works the same way in rAES as it does in the AES, 
but each hex value in the matrix is represented as a 4-bit number instead of as a 
byte.  All of the values in the MixColumns matrix are less than 16 so they can 
directly be written in four bits.  The InverseMixColumns matrix is also just 
changed to represent all of the values as 4-bits instead of bytes.  The 
Table 3: The rAES Round Constants for the 10-round version (in decimal) 
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mathematics was checked and the same values work for the InverseMixColumns 
even though they have been represented as only four bits. 
 The number of rounds was allowed to be variable in rAES.  The minimum 
allowed is one round and the maximum is 10 for a 64-bit key, 12 for a 96-bit key, 
and 14 for a 128-bit key.  For the one round option, the MixColumns is not 
performed, but for all other number of rounds the algorithm operates as normal, 
with the last round not having MixColumns but all the other rounds perform all of 
the steps.  The decryption is done using the inverse steps as described above. 
 The rAES was designed to improve the running time of a possible attack.  
The design of rAES was made to follow the AES as closely as possible as can be 
seen in the description given above.  Now an attempt to attack rAES could be 
made to see if there are any weaknesses.  The rAES is inherently weaker than 
the AES, so if an attack for rAES cannot be found then a similar attack on AES 
would be even less effective.  With the reduced version complete, the equations 
representing it can be found.  The equations used in the attack on rAES are 
described in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III 
APPLIED ATTACK 
 
 
 
The Equations 
 In order to use an XSL-style attack on rAES, the equations that represent 
the steps of the algorithm had to be derived for the 4-bit version.  This derivation 
was similar to that described in [4].  The equations from the encryption and not 
the decryption were found since the equations that result from the MixColumns 
step are simpler than those that result from the InverseMixColumns.  This is 
because performing the multiplication in GF(24) on the values in the MixColumns 
matrix requires fewer calculations than performing them with the 
InverseMixColumns matrix.  The manipulations performed on the bits of the 
plaintext can be grouped into two types, the diffusion done by the AddRoundKey, 
ShiftRows, and MixColumns steps, and the nonlinear step done by SubBytes.  
The equations for the diffusion steps are fairly straight forward to derive, but the 
SubBytes step was designed to try to prevent a simple representation of the 
manipulations on the bits being described as linear equations [13, 14]. 
 Due to the criteria used in the design of the SBox for the AES, it was 
found in [4, 9, 10] that equations that are true for all the different mappings of the 
SBox can be found.  It was found that using first order and second order terms 
from the SBox mappings were sufficient to describe the SBox [4].  The terms 
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came from the input and output bits of the SBox.  Similarly, such equations were 
found to exist for rAES.  Once the SBox for rAES was created (see Fig. 7 on 
page 17) an algorithm to find all of the true equations for this SBox was devised.  
The terms for the rAES SBox are just the bits of the four bits input and four bits 
output, and all the possible second order combinations of the input and output 
bits.  This creates 24 terms.  Since there are 16 entries in the SBox, there are 16 
possible true values for all of the terms.  The terms and all possible values for the 
mappings can be seen in Figure 12 in Appendix A.  The algorithm to find the true 
equations used a nested loop structure to sum under GF(2) all combinations of 
the terms and returned the combinations where the result was 0 or 1 for all 
equations.  This means that no matter what the input to the SBox was, the 
equations would have the same result.  A total of 2039 such equations were 
found to be true for the rAES SBox, with the equations varying in length from only 
five terms all the way up to 20 terms.  Since there are only 24 SBox terms, we 
decided to use 24 of the 2039 SBox equations in the implementation.  The 
specific equations chosen can be seen in Figure 13 in Appendix A. 
 Since the SBox is performed on four bits at a time and there are 64 bits in 
a block, it was necessary to have a different set of 24 SBox equations for each of 
the 16 times the SBox gets used in a single round.  This gives a total of 384 
SBox equations and 384 terms.  Of these 384 terms, 128 are first order and the 
remaining 256 are second order terms. 
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 The equations from the other three steps were more directly determined 
since they are already linear in nature.  The equations for the first AddRoundKey 
step were from the bits of the input plaintext, the bits of the key, and the bits that 
result from using the exclusive-or operation on them.  There are 64 such 
equations with 128 terms (the plaintext bits are known, the key and result bits are 
unknown).  The equations are as follows: 
ri  ki = pi 
where ri is a bit of the result of the AddRoundKey operation, ki is a bit of the key, 
and pi is a bit of the plaintext, with 0 ≤ i < 64. 
 The operations on the bits done by the ShiftRows, MixColumns, and 
second AddRoundKey steps were all combined into a single set of equations.  
These terms in these equations were from the bits of the output of the SBox, the 
bits of the second round key, and the resulting bits from after the round key was 
added.  The locations of the SBox output bits were tracked through the 
ShiftRows and MixColumns steps so that the bit from the SBox that was added to 
a specific bit of the round key was known.  This resulted in the 64 equations.  To 
see if the technique would work even without the MixColumns step, which is what 
occurs if only one round is used, the equations ignoring the MixColumns 
manipulations on the bits were also devised.  These can be seen in Figure 14 in 
Appendix A.  In the one round case there are 64 equations with 128 unknown 
terms since the resulting bits from the final AddRoundKey step are the known 
ciphertext bits. 
 23
 This gives us a total of 512 equations and 512 terms.  All of the equations 
found above are unique, but the terms for the output bits of the first 
AddRoundKey are the same as the input bits to the SBox, and the output bits 
from the SBox are the same as the input bits to the second AddRoundKey.  It 
was considered to attempt to solve subsets of these equations as separate 
systems, but the ratio of the number of terms to the number of equations for any 
subset is not large enough.  For instance, if only the equations from the first 
AddRoundKey are considered we have 128 terms but only 64 equations.  When 
solving linear systems of equations at least an equal number of equations to 
terms is necessary in order to uniquely solve the system using conventional 
methods such as Gaussian Elimination.  Once the equations were determined it 
remained to attempt to solve the system of equations found. 
The Attack 
 The system of equations described above was input to a modified version 
of Gaussian Elimination with Backwards Substitution.  The algorithm was 
modified as shown in Figure 10, to optimize it for operations in GF(2).  The 
normal version solves systems with decimal coefficients and solutions; here all 
the coefficients and solutions will be binary. 
 The modification to the Gaussian Elimination algorithm occurred to the 
steps shown in bold in Figure 10.  Originally the multiplication, subtraction, and 
replacement of row j was performed in every execution of the loops over i and j.  
When m is zero, these steps just end up replacing row j with the same values it 
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already had.  Therefore, if m is zero, all three of these steps can be skipped.  The 
value m can only be zero or one, and if it is one then the steps are executed.  
Modified Gaussian Elimination 
Input: Matrix representation of the system of equations 
Output: Array containing the solutions for each term 
m ← matrix column count – 2 
solutions[m+1] 
for (i ← 0; i < m; i++) 
 p ← n 
 for (k ← 0; k < m; k++) 
  if matrix location (k,i) is one 
   p ← k 
   end loop over k 
 if p ≥ m 
  return false   
if p ≠ i 
  switch row i of the matrix with row p of the matrix 
 for (j ← i+1; j ≤ m; j++) 
  m ← 0 // m is the matrix location (j,i) divided by location (i,i) 
  if matrix location (j,i) is one and matrix location (i,i) is one 
   m ← 1 
   multiply row i of the matrix with m 
   subtract the above from row j of the matrix 
   replace row j of the matrix with the above 
if matrix location (m,m) = 0 
 return false 
if matrix location (m-1,m) is one and matrix location (m-1,m-1) is one 
 solutions[m] ← 1 
else solutions[m] ← 0 
for (i ← m-1; i ≥ 0; i--) 
 sum ← 0 
 for (j ← i+1; j ≤ m; j++) 
  sum ← sum + matrix location (i,j) + solutions[j] 
 sum ← sum mod 2 // math is over GF(2) 
 sum ← matrix location (i, m+1) – sum 
 sum ← sum / matrix location (i,i) 
 if sum = -1 
  sum ← 1 // math in GF(2) 
 solutions[i] ← sum 
return true 
Figure 10:  Modified Gaussian Elimination Version 1 
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The value m is a result of dividing two entries in the matrix, so m is only one if 
both entries are one.  Therefore on average m is only one 25% of the time.  This 
means that the three steps are skipped 75% of the time with this modification.  
Therefore the running time of the Gaussian Elimination has been optimized, 
though the asymptotic running time is the same.  Additional modifications were 
made to the italicized steps because all of the math needs to be done in binary. 
 It turned out that the system I found to represent rAES did not work well 
with the T′ Method.  The T′ Method relies upon each term appearing a relatively 
large number of times in the entire system.  For our system of 512 terms, any 
given term was found to appear in less than 4% of the equations.  This can be 
verified using Appendix A.  This means the number of executions of the T′ 
Method for the rAES equations is beyond the realm of feasibility.  Even though I 
had a system with an equal number of terms and equations, it was found that the 
system was not solvable in its initial state.  In the light of this observation, a 
different approach was taken to attempt to solve the system of equations. 
 For only one round of rAES, the number of equations that could be 
determined was much larger than the number of terms needed to solve the 
system, since typically an equal number of terms and equations are required.  
Therefore, the number of equations was increased to over 512. 
 The Gaussian Elimination algorithm was modified to allow for a non-
square matrix as can be seen in Figure 11.  The constant n was added to the 
algorithm to represent the number of equations in the system.  Before, the 
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number was the same as the number of terms so only one constant, m, was 
required.  In the situations where the number of equations and not the number of 
terms was needed, n has been substituted for m.  Essentially this means that all 
of the equations will be checked to try to find a subset of them that will allow all 
512 terms to be solved. 
 This technique essentially has the same end effect as the T′ Method, but 
achieves it in a different manner.  In the T′ Method the number of total equations 
is increased each time the T′ Method is executed, using our technique the 
number of equations starts out larger than the number of terms.  Then all that 
was required was to run the second modified version of Gaussian Elimination on 
the matrix. 
 The additional equations came from two sources, the SBox Equations 
found previously, and new equations from the ExpandRoundKey.  There were 
2039 SBox equations found and so far only 24 of them have been used in the 
attack.  That leaves 2015 left to try.  Initially, the shortest 24 equations were 
used, now the longest 24 equations will be added to increase the total to 48 
SBox equations over 24 SBox terms.  The second set of SBox equations can be 
seen in Figure 15 in Appendix A.  The ExpandRoundKey step, as described on 
page 7, uses exclusive-or, circular shifts, and the SBox to manipulate the bits.  
The first set of equations used for the SubBytes step was used for the SBox part 
of the ExpandRoundKey equations.  Only one out of every four words is passed 
through the SBox, the other three words per round key just use the exclusive-or 
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operation.  The equations for the ExpandRoundKey are combinations of the 
SBox equations using the ExpandRoundKey terms, and the equations shown in 
Figure 16 in Appendix A. 
Modified Gaussian Elimination 
Input: Matrix representation of the system of equations 
Output: Array containing the solutions for each term 
n ← matrix row count – 1 
m ← matrix column count – 2 
solutions[m+1] 
for (i ← 0; i < m; i++) 
 p ← n 
 for (k ← 0; k < n; k++) 
  if matrix location (k,i) is one 
   p ← k 
   end loop over k 
 if p ≥ n 
  return false   
if p ≠ i 
  switch row i of the matrix with row p of the matrix 
 for (j ← i+1; j ≤ n; j++) 
  m ← 0 // m is the matrix location (j,i) divided by location (i,i) 
  if matrix location (j,i) is one and matrix location (i,i) is one 
   m ← 1 
   multiply row i of the matrix with m 
   subtract the above from row j of the matrix 
   replace row j of the matrix with the above 
if matrix location (m,m) = 0 
 return false 
if matrix location (m-1,m) is one and matrix location (m-1,m-1) is one 
 solutions[m] ← 1 
else solutions[m] ← 0 
for (i ← m-1; i ≥ 0; i--) 
 sum ← 0 
 for (j ← i+1; j ≤ n; j++) 
  sum ← sum + matrix location (i,j) + solutions[j] 
 sum ← sum mod 2 // math is over GF(2) 
 sum ← matrix location (i, m+1) – sum 
 sum ← sum / matrix location (i,i) 
 if sum = -1 
  sum ← 1 // math in GF(2) 
 solutions[i] ← sum 
return true 
Figure 11:  Modified Gaussian Elimination Version 2 
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 The additional 24 SBox equations were added per each four bits.  This 
resulted in an addition of another 384 equations, bringing the total to 896 
equations with the terms remaining at 512.  There are 64 equations from the 
creation of the 64-bit round key.  There are 96 additional SBox equations from 
the round key expansion.  This gives a total of 1056 equations.  The RotWord 
and SubBytes parts of the ExpandRoundKey step produce some additional 
terms, 16 to be exact.  This increases the number of terms to 528.  There are 
also a separate set of second order SBox terms for the ExpandRoundKey which 
increases the total number of terms to 592.  Therefore the system used in the 
attack had 1056 equations describing 592 terms. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
 Initially, the code was run on the 512 term, 512 equation system.  It was 
found that this system was not sufficient to get solutions for all the terms.  When 
run using the first modified version of the Gaussian Elimination algorithm it was 
able to diagonalize the matrix down to term 133 as shown in Appendix A.  The 
code was run on several keys using the same plaintext (the word “plaintext” was 
used since it completely filled one block).  For any key the matrix could only be 
diagonalized to the same term.  Term 133, as can be seen in Table 4 of 
Appendix A, is j2 which is the third bit of the round key.  Since it was apparent 
that more equations related to the round keys were needed, those equations 
were added to the code next. 
 With the round key equations added in, the system was then 592 terms 
and 672 equations.  When the code was run with these changes, using the 
second modified version of the Gaussian Elimination algorithm, the matrix was 
diagonalized down to term 267, r2y3, the second order term of the third bit of the 
input to the SBox and the fourth bit of the output from the SBox.  Again, this 
situation occurred for any key used.  The point where the diagonalization stops is 
shown in an example execution of the attack on page 81.
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 Now, it seemed that more SBox equations were needed to create a 
solvable system, so the second set of SBox equations was added.  This 
increased the number of equations to 1056, leaving the number of terms at 592.  
Unexpectedly, doubling the number of SBox equations had no effect on the 
results of the Gaussian Elimination.  It was still only able to diagonalize the matrix 
to term 267.  Despite having nearly twice as many equations as terms, the 
system was found to be unsolvable.  Increasing the number of equations from 
672 to 1056 had no effect on the solvability of the system.  Considering these 
results it was decided that attempting to include more of the SBox equations 
would not help the situation. 
 In order to see if there was a pattern in the terms that could not be 
diagonalized by the Gaussian Elimination, the code was modified to not break 
when a term was found that could not be diagonalized.  Instead that term was 
added to the matrix in the correct location and just set to zero.  A statement 
noting that a term could not be diagonalized was output each time this occurred.  
When this was done it was found that the same terms in the SBox equations 
were not diagonalizable.  These terms were x2 y3, x3 y0,  x3 y1,  x3 y2, and x3 y3 
through term 319, then in the next set of SBox equations it increased to be x2 y1,  
x2 y2, x2 y3, x3 y0,  x3 y1,  x3 y2, and x3 y3 and continued in that pattern until term 383.  
From term 384 on the pattern was x2 y0, x2 y1, x2 y2, x2 y3, x3 y0, x3 y1, x3 y2, and x3 y3.  
There were also later terms that were found to be undiagonalizable.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
General Conclusions 
 The attack on rAES failed.  Despite having a sparse system of linear 
equations with nearly twice as many equations as terms the system was 
unsolvable, so the key could not be retrieved.  This result is good news for the 
AES.  As noted previously, if the attack on rAES fails, an attack on the AES 
would be even less likely to be successful. 
 In the process of attempting to attack rAES, some interesting side results 
were found.  Based on the experimental results, the solution of the linear system 
of equations representing the steps in rAES is not dependent on the plaintext 
choice or the key choice.  Logically, this makes sense, because the solution for 
an equation equal to one gives you no more information about the terms than an 
equation equal to zero.  This is important because it means that the security of 
rAES is the same no matter how cleverly the plaintext is chosen.  It follows that 
the strength of AES against this type of attack is also independent of the plaintext 
choice or key choice. 
 The improvements to the Gaussian Elimination to optimize it for equations 
in GF(2) improve the running time, but do not reduce the number of executions of 
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any of the loops.  Therefore it would not affect the general execution estimates 
given by others in [4, 9]. 
Future Work 
 The fact that specific terms in the SBox equations were the ones that were 
unsolvable indicates that some rules for selecting the SBox equations could be 
devised.  If such a rule or set of rules could be found, then the entire system of 
equations could be solvable. 
 Using the all available equations instead of the T′ Method reduces the 
running time to only one execution of the Gaussian Elimination algorithm instead 
of approximately 2100 or more.  Since the key and plaintext appear to have no 
effect on the solvability of the system, if a set of equations could be found that 
was solvable, then only one execution of the Gaussian Elimination would be 
needed.  The running time would then be O(n2), where n is the number of 
equations in the system.  The results indicate that finding a set of equations to 
solve even one round was not possible.  The advantage is if a system could be 
found that was solvable, it would only need to be found once.  Then the only 
work required is to set the specific plaintext and ciphertext bits and run the 
Gaussian Elimination on the matrix using the predetermined equations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  All SBox Terms and Mappings 
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x0 + x3 + y1 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x1y0 = 0 
x1 + x3 + x0y1 + x0y3 + x1y0 + x3y3 = 0 
x0 + x1 + x2 + x0y1 + x1y1 + x1y3 + x2y0 = 0 
x0 + x2 + x3 + y3 + x0y0 + x1y2 + x3y0 = 0 
x0 + y0 + y1 + x0y1 + x1y0 + x3y0 = 1 
x1 + y2 + x1y2 + x3y1 + x3y2 = 1 
x1 + y2 + y3 + x0y1 + x1y2 + x2y3 = 1 
x3 + y0 + x0y2 + x3y0 = 1 
x3 + y0 + x0y3 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 = 1 
x3 + y2 + x0y0 + x1y1 + x2y1 = 1 
x3 + y2 + x1y0 + x2y1 + x3y0 + x3y2 = 1 
x2 + x3 + y0 + y3 + x2y0 + x2y3 + x3y3 = 1 
x0y0 + x1y0 + x1y1 + x3y0 + x3y2 = 0 
x0y2 + x0y3 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y2 = 0 
x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y3 + x3y0 = 0 
y1 + x0y0 + x0y3 + x1y0 + x1y3 + x3y1 = 0 
y3 + x0y1 + x2y3 + x3y1 + x3y2 = 0 
y3 + x0y2 + x1y2 + x2y2 + x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
y0 + y2 + x0y2 + x1y0 + x2y1 + x3y2 = 0 
x2 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x3y2 = 0 
x2 + y1 + x0y1 + x1y1 + x2y2 + x3y3 = 0 
x2 + y3 + x0y2 + x1y3 + x2y1 + x3y3 = 0 
x0 + x1 + y1 + x0y2 + x0y3 + x3y3 = 0 
x0 + x3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x2y0 + x2y2 + x3y1 = 0 
Figure 13:  SBox Equations - Set One 
yi  ji = ci for 0 ≤ i < 16 
ym  ji = ci for 16 ≤ i < 28, and 20 ≤ m < 31 
ym  ji = ci for 28 ≤ i < 32, and 16 ≤ m < 20 
ym  ji = ci for 32 ≤ i < 40, and 40 ≤ m < 48 
ym  ji = ci for 40 ≤ i < 48, and 32 ≤ m < 40 
ym  ji = ci for 48 ≤ i < 52, and 60 ≤ m < 64 
ym  ji = ci for 52 ≤ i < 64, and 48 ≤ m < 60 
Figure 14:  Equations after the SBox 
Where yi and ym are the bits output from the SBox adjusted for the ShiftRows, 
ji are the bits of the second round key, and ci are the bits of the ciphertext. 
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x0 + x1 + y0 + y2 + y3 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x0y3 + x1y0 + 
x1y1 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + x3y2 + 
x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x1 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + 
x1y1 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + 
x3y1 + x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x2 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y3 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + 
x3y3 = 1 
 
x0 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y2 + x2y3 + 
x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x3y0 + 
x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + 
x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y2 = 0 
 
x1 + x3 + y0 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y3 + 
x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y2 + 
x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x1 + x2 + y1 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x2y0 + x2y2 + x3y1 + x3y2 + 
x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x1 + x2 + y1 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x1y0 + x1y1 + 
x1y2 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y3 + x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y2 + 
x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x1 + x2 + y1 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + 
x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x1 + x2 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y3 
+ x1y1 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + x3y1 
+ x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x1 + x2 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y1 + x0y3 + x1y0 
+ x1y2 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y2 
+ x3y3 = 0 
x0 + x1 + x3 + y0 + y1 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + 
x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y2 = 1 
 
x0 + x1 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + 
x2y3 + x3y0 = 1 
 
x0 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + 
x0y3 + x1y0 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y3 + x3y0 + 
x3y1 + x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y2 + x0y3 
+ x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x2y0 + x2y3 + x3y0 + x3y1 
= 0 
 
x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y2 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + 
x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + x0y1 + x0y2 + x1y1 + 
x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y1 + 
x3y2 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 + 
x1y0 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + 
x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y2 + x0y3 + 
x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + 
x3y1 + x3y3 = 0 
 
x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y1 + x0y2 
+ x0y3 + x1y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + x3y1 
+ x3y2 = 0 
 
x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + y1 + y2 + y3 + x0y0 + x0y2 + x1y0 
+ x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x3y0 + x3y2 
+ x3y3 = 0 
 
x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + y0 + x0y0 + x0y2 + x0y3 + x1y0 + 
x1y2 + x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x3y0 + x3y1 + x3y2 + 
x3y3 = 1 
 
x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + y2 + x0y2 + x1y0 + x1y1 + x1y2 + 
x1y3 + x2y0 + x2y1 + x2y2 + x2y3 + x3y0 + x3y1 + 
x3y2 + x3y3 = 1
Figure 15:  SBox Equations – Set Two 
 38
0 = k0 + z0 + j0 
0 = k1 + z1 + j1 
0 = k2 + z2 + j2 
1 = k3 + z3 + j3 
0 = kt + zt + jt  for 4 ≤ t < 15 
0 = ju + ku + jv  for 16 ≤ u < 64 and 0 ≤ v < 48 
Figure 16:  ExpandRoundKey Equations  
Where ji with 0 ≤ i < 64 are the bits of the first round key and zm with 0 ≤ m < 16 
are the bits of the output of the SubBytes operation 
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Table 4:  Matrix Terms - First Half 
Above are the terms used in the system of equations, they are numbered 
in the order they are stored in the matrix shown in the sample data. 
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Table 5:  Matrix Terms - Second Half 
Above are the terms used in the system of equations, they are numbered in the 
order they are stored in the matrix shown in the sample data. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
INPUT DATA 
 
 
 
 The following 27 pages contain an example of the matrix input to the 
Gaussian Elimination.  There are ten bits per each column of the table.  If all the 
bits in a cell were zero, only one zero is shown instead of ten. 
 This example had the following data from the execution of rAES: 
The plaintext is: 
0111000001101100011000010110100101101110011101000110010101111000 
The ciphertext is: 
1011100010110111110110000111100011100101100101011011100110100010 
The key is: 
1000111110100100011111110000101100110100100101011110100011000001
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APPENDIX C 
 
OUTPUT DATA 
 
 
 
 The following 28 pages contain an example of the matrix output from the 
Gaussian Elimination.  There are ten bits per each column of the table.  If all the 
bits in a cell were zero, only one zero is shown instead of ten. 
 This example had the following data from the execution of rAES: 
The plaintext is: 
0111000001101100011000010110100101101110011101000110010101111000 
The ciphertext is: 
1011100010110111110110000111100011100101100101011011100110100010 
The key is: 
1000111110100100011111110000101100110100100101011110100011000001 
 70
 
 
 71
 
 
 72
 
 
 73
 
 
 74
 
 
 75
 
 
 76
 
 
 77
 
 
 78
 
 
 79
 
 
 80
 
 
 81
 
 
 82
 
 
 83
 
 
 84
 
 
 85
 
 
 86
 
 
 87
 
 
 88
 
 
 89
 
 
 90
 
 
 91
 
 
 92
 
 
 93
 
 
 94
 
 
 95
 
 
 96
 
 
 97
 
 98
 
